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based on the future income ofthe borrower. Originally proposed by MiltonFriedman and endorsed by the
ZachariaS Panel onEdU(attOti(1i lmiot'atimi. has now heeii cinnsninced by Yale and Duke
Unirersities and is beingsoup/U by the Governor of Ohio. Given this interest. it 0IiiI port ant that the undr-
lying iitplicat01i5 ofthe COnhinUUin of inco,iie eoiitingerk5arriingiiiiehits he ssteinaally explore!.
The purpose of this paper isthe identifa ation of the gciuric charw'Ierotics of Iiiiiset of 5uch icccini'-
contihigent_rPt(Yt instrUni'hi1S ;the variable term limit (I TL).Sett ion I briefly examinesthe /Jjsrciri
and rationale of such a program.The V IL ,iodel is developed anal ytaally inSt'c!ioti II. The data required
for the solution of tiit'model are detelopcd in Sect ion III SectionII the it so! ics the niodil for a ont I nuion
of ':ero-prQ.fil" pro grams(Jill! conipart's progra?iis inc irporattngalter,iiitti& structural features. Sec t ion I
exalitWeS the incomeredicrrihut ion /'at ares or i,icidenet'. andSection II the capita! requirements iif a
se!ected set of pro grams.
1. INTROI)UCTION
It is beyond disputethat we are currentlywitnessing a major financialcrisis in
higher education. Asportrayed by the Cheit Report.this crisis is. with minor
exceptions, all pervasive.affecting or imminentlythreatening public and private
institutions, large universities,and small colleges.' This currentcrisis is particularly
significant in the contextof the growing efforts toextend and insure equalityof
educational opportunity:10make access to post-secondarYeducation a function
only of academicability, not of ability to pay.It is the threat toeducational
opportunity posed by the presentfinancial crisis thatunderlies the present interest
in innovation and reform.
The central fact in the presentfinancial situation ofhigher education is that
the cost to the student(tuition and other feesandforegone income)will not be
reduced and in fact willprobably increasesignificantly. With rising costsand
shrinking endowments andwith governmenteducation budgets underpressure
from competing socialclaims, ever greaterproportions of the cost arebeing passed
on to students.In this situation.virtually any newfinancial option forstudents
would help to ease some ofthe economic grimnessin higher education.
This study ssas carried out underthe auspiceS of the t)isisionof Htghcr Educationand Research
of the Ford Foundation. Significant
progransirliiig and research assistanCeaiidoinputer time were
provided by the National Bureauof Economic Research.
particularly valuable contributions tothe study were madebSlarshail A. Robinson ofthe
Foundation and by Robert W. t4artmanof the BrookingSInstitution. Etiiaheth Pmnkstondeseloped
the income data underlying thecomputations. Mrs. CynthiaKiner desersesparticulIr commendation
for preparing the original manuscript,including the numeroustables. dod for constantlybringing order
to chaos.
Earl Cheit, The New Depressionin higher Ldiicaliofl.Carnegie ConinhiSStOilSeries. I chrUar
1971. McGrawilill.
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The central concept of interest here is proposal made by Milton Friedman
over a decade ago for financing a student's costs of highereducation by extending
credit against a promise of long-terra payment of a percentage of annual inconie.2
The first comprehensive plan of this sort caine in 1967 from a Panel on Education
Innovation chaired by Jerroid Zacharias of M.i.T. The PanJ called for the creation
of an "Educational Opportunity Bank" chartered by the federal government and
empowered to borrow at government rates. The Panel recommended that students
be allowed to borrow up to total tuition, lees, arid living costs. The borrower
would pledge to pay a fixed percentage of his annual gross income. Preliminary
figures suggested that such a Bank, with access to funds at federal interest rates,
could be self-sustaining if the repayment was 1 percent of gross income for each
S3,000 borrowed, and the term of payment 30 years.3
The present analysis has as its objectives the delineation of the generic
characteristics of an income-related-payment or variable term loan program and
the development or a set of financially viable specific-options.
The remainder of the introduction considers the rationale for a development
of the variable term loan concept and exaniines briefly two particularly contro-
versial features of income-contingent loan programs: the implied redistribution
of educational costs and the likelihood of adverse self-selection of participants.
The analytics of the variable term loan are then briefly explored in Section Il.
Section III develops the underlying data base required for the identification of
financially viable variable term loan alternatives. Section IV then "solves" the
system for a continuum of consistent programs. Section V examines the income-
redistributive incidence and Section VI the capital requirements of various pro-
grams.
Conceptual Origins and Rationale
This type of variable term loan (VTL) program has a number of implications
for students: the most important relate to improved access of students to funds
for the financing of higher education.
Isnper/ections in the human capital market. Unlike credit for investment in
productive physical capital, which is readily available, the market for credit for
investment in human capital is, with a few very narrow and imperfect exceptions,
non-existent. The individual student finds it almost impossible to tap those
sources of credit available to the corporate investor in plant and equipment;
although both are borrowing against future income, the investor in physical
capital has the capital stock itself as collateral, while the student (subjectto
strictures against involuntary servitude) has only his incomeprospects.
Furthermore, even when it is possible for the student to borrow foreducational
investment. the terms are grossly non-optimal with respectto the flexibility and
2Milton Friedman. n K. A. Solo, ed. Econo,njis and the PublicInterest INew Brunswick: l955)
also. ''The Higher Schooling in America." Tlit' Public lntere.sr.Spring 1965
1ducauonal Opportunity J3ank : A Report of the Panelon Educational I nno allan t5Vashin ton)
1) U.: U.S (tosernmeni Printing 0111cc. August t967j. flPanel's proposal was subjected to more
teiailed aitalssis in Karl Shell ci al.. "The Education OpportunityBank : Ar, Economic Analysis of a
Continucnt Rcpament Loan for Higher Edtjcaiior' National Journal, Vol. XXI, No. IMarch I9f5.
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atiming of repayments. in effect, his borrowing is restricted to some form of a
personal loan requiring fixed repayments. At best he can anticipate the initiation
of repayment at the end of his student or military career. At worst, he must pay at
least interest on his borrowing from the time he accepts the loan. in either case
the burden is greatest when his ability to pay fincome is least. The effect of these
capital market imperfections is even greater in context of the apparent general
desire to redistribute lifetime consumption toward earlier ages, when a confluence
of life-cycle and other factors (risk avoidance, etc.) serve to raise the marginal
utility of consumption, while the lifetime income profile displays rising incomes
with age and experience.4
In short, investment in human capital is treated by the conventional credit
market in the same terms as a personal consumption loan, while the expenditure
is more similar to investment in productive capital than to payment for current
consumption benefits. These restrictions on the forms of student borrowing are a
major explanation of the well-documented inhibitions which many studentsexpress
toward this form of educational finance. Furthermore, even given these inhibitions,
the supply of the more desirable student loan funds is significantly less than current
demand.
Dependence on current ahil!t%' to pay.As a result of the foreclosure of the
credit market as a source of funds for investment in education. access to higher
education is to a high degree a function of current family income and weahh.
The effect of this current means constraint on the socioeconomic composition of
the student (or, more importantly. the non-student) population is obvious.
Risk avoidance in the assessment of benefits to higher education. Even
when credit is available on reasonably acceptable terms, the student (or potential
student) may weigh heavily the risks of shortfall in future income, especially relative
to the fixed repayments. This would be expected to be particularly true of students
whose experiences have led them to a skeptical attitude toward their future
prospects and whose information concerning these prospects is most imperfect.
Again, the socioeconomic impact is obvious.
Improved self selectionofstudents.The existing system of higher education
finance almost insures that the student will bear only a small part of the total
cost of his education. In consequence, the student has few incentives to refuse
education or seriously consider other alternatives, especially if his parents' ability
to pay is sufficiently great to offset, for him, foregone earnings. This improved
self-selection is, then. the mirror image of point 2, above. By placing a substantial
part of the cost of education on the student himself, and by breaking the relation-
ship between current financial status and access to education. elilciency can be
expected to improve both from the inclusion of previously excluded students and
from the voluntary exclusion of some of those previously included.
Secularly increasing real costsofhigher education.Ostensibly as a result
of the effort to maintain educational quality, higher education represents to some
degree a technologically stagnant sector in a non-stagnant economy. Thus, input
per student has not undergone any major secular change. while productivityin
On the optimal distribution of consumption, see Lester C. Thurow. "The Optimum Lifetime
Distribution of Consumption Expendituces."American Economic Reciew, Vol. LIX. No. 3(June 19691.
61other sectors has increasedcontinuously. As a result. cost (per unit of input ad
per student) hasbeen rising and can he expected to continue to do c. Obviously
this is a particularly seriousconstraint in light of the previously!Itefltioned
imperfections in the market for highereducation.
6. Refusal a the broader societto direct! compensate/or thi'?ip'r/ec(IonS
and constraints. These difilculties associated with access to higher education and
with educational finance could be overcome by direct SOcial Intrusion Society
could redirect resources to higher education (via. e.g. highly subsidized student
loans) and could require appropriate changesin relative access. l-Joweverit has
not done so. In the absence of sonic newinitiative the strains on educational
institutions will increase and the adverse effects of existing imperfections will be
magnified.
Redistribution of Educational Costs Efiecied hr1/icPlan
The central characteristic of an income contingency plan is that it relates
the costs of education to the ability to pay. For the individual student it relates
repayments in any year to income in that year; this isery different from Con yen-
tional student loans which impose fixed repayments concentrated in the student's
early. low-earning, high-desired consumption years. Thus the student, through
the plan, is given access to the capital market on flexible repayment (quasi-equit)')
terms.
More fundamentally. the programimposes higher absolute burdens on those
participants who realize higher incomes. For a number of students this is a very
desirable feature. A major source of student unwillingness to borrow on conven-
tional terms is uncertainty regarding future occupation and future income
prospects. The risks to the student of investment in education are reduced through
an effective risk-sharing pool : although his repayment may be greater than average
if his income is high. short-falls in income reduce the absolute cost of education.
Thus, the program can be interpreted as a partial insurance against low
income. Further, only through this risk-sharing pool can the credit market be
tapped for educational investment .A" risk neutral" student with average income
expectations is indifferent to variable versus fixed repayments; a "risk-avoiding"
student prefers variable to fixed repayments. Only a "risk-seeking" student, or
one with significantly above average income expectations. would prefer fixed
repayments.5
Another interpretation of the plan is that of a beneficiary tax for the support
of higher education, a tax relating payments to the financial benefits the student
derives from his education. The VTL plan moves only partially in this direction.
Most importantly the plan is not a general tax in that individuals may choose.
by paying current tuition, not to participate. However, the greater burden on a
high income participant relative to his counter-part non-participant is limited by
the exit provision, which insures that he wiU not repay more than some maximum
amount. This limited horizontal inequity may be off-set by the improved access
to and terms of borrowing to finance education. If the plan were extended to a
These statements must, of course. be qualified with reference to the specific ternis of the payment
provisions and the siudent's subjective probability distribution over alternative fuiure incomeS
62universal beneilciary tax it might be desirahieto significantly increase the maximum
liability of high income students.
Thus, the VTL plan has characteristics of both a tax and insurance. Because
the income expectations of all potential participants are not identical andbecause
appropriate alternative sources of finance are not provided by financial markets.
the tax features necessarily but imperfectly intrude.
Adaerse SelectionofParticipants
A major concern with respect to an income related payment plan is thatthe
self-selection of participants would lead to concentrations of participants with very
low income expectations, which, if unanticipated. could lead to thefinancial
failure of the plan. Several considerations suggest that this would not be a serious
problem:
It is not clear that an individual's income expectations, particularlyfor
undergraduates. are at all well-founded. except in the case of those who expect
to inherit stibstantial wealth. These individuals would beassumed not to partici-
pate. In consequence, only earned income, not incomefrom wealth or family
income, has been considered in deriving the income profiles used inthe financial
analysis.
Scholarship students can be expected to he significantly more highly
represented, sinceanylevel of fees is most burdensome to this group. It might
be expected that the income experience of this group would divergefrom that of
all students (on which basis the income projections would probablybe made).
Evidence from a study of Harvard graduates suggests that this would notbe the
case ; students who received financial aidhad approximately the same meanearned
income as did non-aided students, although the shape of thedistribution was
somewhat different (higher representation in the lower and uppertails of the
distribution). This is a major rationale for using only earned incomein the con-
struction of the income projections of participants.
While significant adverse selection, particularly in thegraduate and
professional schools, might be expected if alternative, flexible meansof aid were
available, in fact, such instruments are not available. That is. it isbelieved that the
major advantages of the plan, relating repayment to theability to pay over the
individual's lifetime, are sufficient to lead even students with relativelyhigh income
expectations to prefer the variable repayment plan to the typeof conventional
loan available commercially.
Because of the above considerations and of the desire not tobias potential
experiments by anticipating adverse selection (and thuscreating a self-fulfilling
prophecy), virtually no self-selection by future income has beenanticipated.
11. VARIABLE TERM LOANS: A GENERAL ANALYSIS
Summary of VTL Characteristics
The student would receive a loan at a stated interestrate and would agree to
repay in installments defined as afixed percentage of his adjusted gross incomefor
the preceding year. He would continue to repayuntil he had discharged his debt or
63until he had reached the termination rear. At the termination year any further
liability of the student would be forgiven.
The various loan options available to students could differ in (a) stated
interest rate, (b) repayment "tax" rate, and (c) maximum repayment period. Thus,
variations in terms. e.g.. a lower repayment tax rate, would have costs. e.g., a
higher interest rate. These compensating variations in terms derive from the
application of a zero-profit condition in program derivation. In the following it is
assumed that the future incomes (income distributions) of participating students
would be the same for each of the program variants, i.e. that negative selection
between VTL options would not be observed. The problems posed by self-selection
of students among the available programs are discussed below.
TheAnalyticsofVTL
Given.
t,the interest rate (including allowance for administrative and
collection costs) at which the progrwn is funded (the external interest
rate)
Y, a matrix of participant incomes by repayment year (participants
measured in standard units of debt outstanding at the initiation of
repayment).
Parameters:
(I) r, the interest rate charged the student participant (the internal
interest rate);
(2) N. the maximum repayment period;
t,the repayment "tax" rate.
The determination of any two parameters, plus the "financial viability" condition,
i.e. a breakeven program, determines the values o!' the third. That is, only two
parameters are independent.
Resultantcharacteristics,'
(I) M, the anticipated average or "expected" repayment period;
(2) S, the internal subsidy incorporated in a program, redistributed from
high to low income participants.
Zero Profit-Loss Condition, the "financial viability" condition subjectto
which parameters are determined:
(I) it = 0=Jir,t,N;F, Y)
Briefly stated, the parameters of a program whichmust be defined are the
maximum repayment period, the interest rate charged the student, and therepay-
ment tax rate. Given these, it is possible to estimateor predict two additional
characteristics of the program: the expectedor average repayment period, i.e.
the length of time required by theaverage student to discharge his debt (less than
or equal to the maximum repayment period) and the degree of internal subsidiza-
tion (from high income to lower incomeformer students). These are the particularly
important features of which the student shouldbe informed in guiding his choice
among the available options. The expected incomes of the student participants
64and the interest rate at which the program is funded (including administrative
cost and mortality factors)are necessary inputs into the determination offinaricially
viable parameter sets.
Equation I provides an implicit relationship between r, 1, and N. given ? and







(depending on rate of income growth and discount rate). The relationships em-
bodied in equation 2 are portrayed graphically in Figure 1.
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Figure 1Zero-Profit r-t-N Combinations
Specifying the maximum repayment period, a schedule of financially viable
interest rate (r)repayment tax rate (t) combinations can be identified (equation I);
these combinations are consistent with a zero-profit/loss program. The general
characteristic of this schedule is that reductions in the repayment tax rate must be
compensated by increases in the internal (student) interest rate: reductions in the
tax rate result in greater "losses" on "non-completers" (those who do not discharge
their debts within the maximum repayment period), i.e. in a larger pool of non-
completers and in greater shortfalls from previous non-completers, with these
losses made up from the higher interest burdens placed on those who do complete.
Thus, as the tax rate is reduced, the viability of the program is maintained by
increasing the differential between the students' interest charge and the interest
rate at which the program is funded.
Reductions in the maximum repayment period, implying lower total pay-
ments by "non-completers" (the lowest income participants), thus require com-
pensating increases in the tax rate and/or the student interest rate. As a result the
zero-profit r-t loci shift up and to the right with reductions in the maximum term.
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IThe average repayment period. M, is determined as a function of thebasic
program parameters. i.e.




(I'M/li)1 = (I'M/IN)/(Ir/IN) > 0.
Again holding the maximum repayment period constant, reductionsin the
interest rate compensated by increases in the tax rate reduce theaverage or
expected repayment period: higher income participants exitsooner both because
of the higher annual payments resulting from the higher taxrate and because their
outstanding balances are accruing interest at a lower rate. Thelower income
participants either exit when they would previously have been heldin the program
for the niaximum period or are unafiBcted in terms of their periodof liability,
although they are affected in the amount of the liability.
Even with the above restrictions iso-expccted-repaymentperiodloci could
take on a number of shapes. The primary determinant of the shapeis the dispersion
in participant incomes. lfthere are a substantial number of lowincome participants
paying for the maximum term, then to hold the expectedrepayment period
constant would require that a reduction in the maximum term becompensated
by a lengthening of the observed term of higher incomeparticipants to offset the
shortened term of liability of low income individuals, i.e.the tax rate would have
to be reduced and the interest rate increased. In thiscase the M-constant locus
would be negatively sloped but steeper than thebreak-even i-i loci, cutting the
latter from below. Alternatively if incomeswere less dispersed, with few partici-
pants paying for the maximum term, it is possible thata reduction in the maximum
term accompanied by increases in both the interestand tax rates would leave the
expected repayment period constant, i.e. theiso-expected-repayment period loci
would be positively sloped. The alternativeconceivable iso-expected repayment
period loci are portrayed in Figure 2.




rThe implicit subsidy, from high to low income participants, is similarly a
function of the underlying parameters. For present purposes, the subsidy can he
operationally defined as the ratio of the present value of the excess payments of
high income students to the total loans to the group of borrowers:
I[minN,Q) 1 /
S = ty1(l +- P / 2PZ j1L ii Jabs!
where P = the base borrowing amount, to which the tax t is linked (assuming no
lag from time of borrowing to repayment initiation);
Z = the number of "base amount borrowers";
the income of borrower] in year i;
Q = is defined as that year in which the individual borrower's repayments
fulfill the condition
Q
P =tv1(l + r)Th
where r is the stated student interest rate, greater than the funds borrowing rate, i;
and abs means the absolute value of the expression in parenthesis!'
The subsidy thus defined is again a function of the program parameters and




(aS/er), = (ôS/N)/(tr/N) > 0.
The general shape of the iso-subsidy loci is more determinate than that of the
iso-expected-repayment-period loci. First holding the maximum term constant,
an increase in the tax rate, accompanied by a compensating reduction in the
internal interest rate, results in a reduction in subsidy: high income participants
exit sooner at lower interest rates (the contribution to subsidy being a function of
(1) the difference between the internal and external interest rates, and (2) the period
of time over which this differential is paid, actually of the weighted average out-
standing balance)7 while low income participants pay at higher tax rates for up to
the full period. Then, to achieve the former level of subsidy at the new, higher tax
rate, the maximum term must be reduced, reducing the payments of low income
participants, and this reduction in term must he compensated by an increase in the
internal (student) interest rate, resulting in greater subsidy contribution from
higher income participants. Thus, the iso-subsidy loci will be positively sloped as
shown in Figure 3.
6 A more realistic, but complex, formulation of the subsidy is utilized in Section IV, taking into
account interest accrual during the lag from time of borrowing to repayment initiation.
The weight is (1 + r - i. representing the value to the program of the interest differential paid
in an' future year. This expression is an approximation of 1(1 + r)!(l + fl. but for r andsmall the
above expression is sufficiently accurate.
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Figure 3Iso-Suhidy Loci
lnco,,w Project ions, Adverse Selectio,: andExperimental "Neutraliij''
Each of the zero-profit programs difkrs ina specifiable direction interms of the degree of subsidy provided lowincome participants by theirhigh income
counterparts. This would suggest that high incomeexpectors would bemore likely to choose the lower subsidyprogram, eE'teris parihus. In fact,ofcourse, other things are not equal; the changein subsidy is the resultofsimultaileous compensating changes in tax rates, interestrates, and maximum andaverage repayment periods (or some subset of these).Thus, it is not clear thatstudents expecting high incomes would choosethe less subsidizing option.However, the expectation that studentsmightsystematically self-selectamong alternatjes might seem to recommend that,in the interest of financialviability, the income projections of the higher internalsubsidy options should headjusted downward relative to the lower subsidyoptions. i.e. that adversesellselection should he anticipated. The problem withthis course of action is thatit could well be a "self- fulfilling prophecy :" theexpectationofadverse selection would leadto a relative adjustment in programparameters which would reinforce andincrease the incentives of students anticipatinghigh incomes toenter the lower subsidy program.
In consequence,experimental programs shouldbe based on "neutral"
income projections, i.e.the income projectionsunderlying the alternative options should be identical. Theresponse of students with differentincome expectations to the alternative options,and the relative incomeexperienceofparticipatits in each program would thenprovide informationon the degreeofself-selection and the importance ofparticular variations interms.
Ill. TIME OFBORROWING, EDUcATIONAlATfAIN\1I:Nf ANt) FUTURE INCUStE
OF BORROWERS
To designa financially viable (zeroprofit) VTL program itis necessary to estimate the lag fromthe timeofborrowing to the timeofrepayment initiation and the futureincomes on whichannual repayments willhe based. Because the national_stmpleincome data isidentified by ed ucationalattainment, this
68procedure is broken into two stages: distributingborrowers by time of borrowing
and educatoflal aftaininent, and thendistributing amounts borrowed (including
interest accrued to time of repaymentinitiation) to educational-itttaiflmCfl-
specific income profiles.
The distribution by time of borrowing and aniountborrowed begins with
some basic statistics oncohort retention ratios and educational attainment.Un-
fortunately, these data are fairly sparse, and significantinterpolations and judge-
ments must be made.
**42 percent of freshmen entering into full-timestudy do not receive a bac-
calaureate degree.
43 percent of baccalaureate graduatesentergraduate or profssional schools.8
The judgementally interpolated retention profileis given in Table 1.
TARIE I
C0LIEGL ESTRANT RFTFNnON PROFILE
Forty-two do not complete baccalaureate degree.
Thirty-five cease after baccalaureate degree or do notfinish hrth year.
Twenty-three obtain at least one full post-graduate year.
The analysis assumes stability in thesize of entering freshman classes. More
significantly, it assumes equalrates at part ,cipatiOflat all levels. While participation
rates are not in fact known.assuming that they will he equal at alllevels rests on (a)
a claim of ignorance(no particular adjustment can berationalized) and (b) the
reasonable hypothesis that while income prospectsof post-graduate students arc
higher (as is probably also true of currenteconomic status of parents) their financial
capabilities have been significantlyreduced as a result of a protractedperiod of
schooling.
Given the retention profile for eachyear's borrowers it is then possible to
estimate the distribution of borrowersby class-year of borrowing. lag torepayment.
and ultimate educational attainment(Table 2). Table 3 converts this to adistribu-
tion of a standard Sl,000 unit oforiginal borrowing.
Robert H. Beris. "Higher EducationOpportunity and Achieemeni in theUnited States."
pp. 161, 169. JointEconomic Committee papers on T!rt' Icorio,,riC.oid Fi,iaiiciflgJ IIigIn r lJduwtoU
in the U,iiied Stares. U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, Washington 1969.Further data reIeant to the
interpolation_extrapolation of the complete retentionprofile were developed from a numberot sources
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Finally, itis necessary to distribute borrowers,identified by educational
attainment, over alternative future income profiles.To achieve this result, decile
income classes by age were developed for eachof the three educational attainment
categories from a cross-classification of income byeducation by age derived from
the 1970 Census and based upon 1969 moneyincomes.
For all educational attainment categories, itis assumed that the highest
income decile contains no programborrowers. Beyond this highest-decile
exclusion, participation rates are assumed not to varysystematically by income
class. Thus, each of the lower nine decilesis assumed to contain approximately
11 percent of the participants with thatultimate educational attainment. Further-
more, it is assumed thateach decile-division income is representativeof that
section of the distribution spanning it, e.g. thatthe eight decile income (separating
the eight from the ninth decile) representsthe incomes of all persons included in
the 76th to 85th percentile range.
To reduce the number of separatelyobserved income profiles an effort was
made to identify decile age patterns forthe various educational attainment
categories which are closely similar andcould be "collapsed' to provide a single
"observed" income profile. Fifteen such groupingsofincome deciles were developed
from the underlying data.
The income profiles relevant to theidentification of viable variable term loan
programs, of course, do not relateincome to age but income to repayment year.
For this purpose it is necessary tomake some assumption concerning age atthe
time of repayment initiation. Forsimplicity it is assumed that all students com-
mence repayment at age23. While for "less than baccalaureate"students this
procedure undoubtedly overstates earlyincomes, for "baccalaureateplus"
students the reverse is true: as a result thepossible effects of this assumption are not
deemed to be significantly adverse. Thefinal step in the conversion of income by
age into income by repayment yearis to assume that the mean 25 to34 income is
representative of income in the seventh repayment year,i.e. at age 29, and similarly
for the other age-specific incomes.
The interpolation_extrapolationrequired to obtain income ineach repay-
ment year from income infour widely separated repayment years(the 7th. 17th.
27th, and 37th) involves furtherassumptions. First, income at age 55-64 isICSS than
that at 45-54 in all cases. Areasonable hypothesis is that the age59 income is
downward-biased by the number ofretirements concentrated at theend of the
period, beyond what would amount tothe 35th year of the program.Since 35 years
will be the longest maximum repaymentperiod examined, incomes at theend of
the terminal period are not relevant.Therefore, only the first three incomeobserva-
tions are utilized in thecompletion of the profiles.
A number of functional formscould be utilized o fit a"continuous" income
profile to the three observed points.Because the increase in incomeis relatively
less between the 17th and27th years than between the7th and 17th, it appears
generally reasonable to stabilizeincome (cease incomegrowth) at some point
between the 17th and 27th years.
While the most reasonableassumption concerning thepre-stabilization
portion of the income profilewould be an exponential. or morelikely, an S-shapc
growth curve, greater simplicity arguesin favor of linear growth(equal yearly
71increments). The generally sensible "starling salaries'' ('earOI1CInCOmes) implied
by fitting a straight line to the first two points add justification to theprocedure
The general procedure was to (a) determine the ann ual increment hr fIttinga
straight line to the 7- and 17-year points. (h) extrapolate beyond year 17 untilthe
year 27 income is determining the ''number of years of growth.''(C)
assume constant income beyond that point, and (d) extrapolate back from year 7 to
year I at the year 7 o year 17 income growth rate to determine the starting salary.
TAIII.E 4
DISTRIHUTIONS OF PARTICIPANTS liv Et)tJ('AIU)NA! ArlAINSIINi Ovik INCOML PRuIItlS
Inca me Profiles RI UCat ional Au a inmL'nt
* The lop 10pelcertt of income receivers of each educational attainmentare assumed not to
participate and have been excluded from the distributions.
f Including year I.
The complete "stylized profiles"are summarized in Table 4 the table also identi-
fies the percentage ofparticipants from each educational attainmentgroup
allocated to each of the fifteenprofiles.
Only the first and the fifteenthprofiles require special comment. With
reference to the highest profile,for the range of plans to be tested,it is virtually
necessary that individuals with these incomesexit prior to the end of the maximum
repayment period. But the surplusto the fund contributed by these exiters is
greater the longer they repay. Thus,omerxuiting their incomes results in an under-
statement of the fund's surplus;to avoid resting the fund'ssuccess on the highesl
income participants (whomight not participate) it is deemedadvisable to overstate the starting salary andannual increment for the highestprofile. For similar reasons,





















12.000 39.000 1,000 28 6 6
2 9.400 24,600 800 20 ii
3 8,400 21,700 700 20 6 II
4 8,400 18,400 500 21 I II
5 8.950 16,300 350 22 Il II
6 7,650 13,950 350 19 II it
7 6,900 12.300 300 19 II II
8 5.150 11,450 350 19 II
9 6.600 10,400 200 20 II 11
10 6,300 9,500 203 17 11
11 2,900 9,700 400 18 II
12 5,300 8,500 200 17 II II
13 950 7.250 350 19 II II 14 2,400 5.600 200 17 Ii II
IS 2.000 2,000 0 1 6 6 ô
Total*
100 100 100Several conservative biases are incorporated in the income profiles. First.
the "baccalaureate plus'' income data refer to all persons who have obtained five
or more years of school, regardless of when or under what circumstances they
obtained the fifth year. However, the retention profile increments the educational
attainment of only those graduates who enter full-time post-haccalaurete stud
in the year following the receipt of the bachelors degree. Thus. persons who obtain a
fifth year of study on a part-time basis, e.g. teachers fulfilling certification require-
ments, are included in the derivations of the income data but are not eligible for the
loan programs. This difference in mix would be expected to raise the incomes of the
program's "baccalaureate plus" participants. Conversely, the completion of
additional study by "baccalaureate" or "less than baccalaureate" participants is
ignored, resulting in an understatement of their incomesi.e. some of the "less
than baccalaureate" participants vill eventually complete a degree program, most
on a part-time basis, and some "baccalaureate" participants will obtain post-
graduate study, but the income effects of the additional education are not in-
corporated in the profiles in either case.
The analysis will allow for inflationary income increases (see Section IV).
Thus, an individual's real income will rise over his lifetime due to the effect of age
and experience, i.e. his lifetime real income will follow the relevant profile. and
further, that profile, in its entirety. will rise in current-dollar terms as a result of
inflationary increases in wages and prices over time. But in addition the entire
profile shifts upward as a result of real productivity gains in the economy. As
demonstrated by Table 5, a secular real income growth rate of from I to 2 percent
per year would be defensible.
Finally, it is necessary to consider the impact of mortality on the performance
of the programs. For this purpose age-specific survival rates were developed on the
assumption that borrowing took place at age 20 and that repayment initiation
TABLE 5
REAL INCOMEGROWTh By EDucATIoNCLASS. 19561968
Cumulative Lifetime Income at Age 18 and Annual Percentage increases
(Constant 1968 dollars, thousands)
Year





Only 1-3 years 4+ years 4 years 5+ years
1956 $303 S407 S270
1958 300O.5° 4191.5',,S379 S458 2572.5',,
1961 3242.5 434 1.0 4233.5 '.454 - 0.5,, 2762.0
1963 334 1.5 4522.0 435 1.0 4732.0 2943.0
1964 3412.0 4550.5 4360.0 4760.5 2992.0
1966 3663.5 5004.5 4784.5 529 5.5 3203.5
1967 3752.5 5204.0 485 1.5 558 5.5 3293.0
1968 378 1.0 515 1.0 489-1.0 544-2.5 3362.0
Annual
Increase l.7° 1.8°,,occurred at age 23-24. The survival ratios range from0.99 in the firstyear to
0.80 in the thirtieth. In Section IV two uses of this profile wilt be made: (l)theeffect
of mortality on zero-profit programs with group self-insurance will beassessed
and (2) lump sumlife insurance premia will be determined.
IV. DERIVtNG ZtRO-PROFIT VTL PROGRAMS
This section takes the previously developed distributions of borrowersby (a)
lag to repayment and (b) future income and identifies sets ofprogram parameters
consistent with zero-profit/loss for the Fund. The basicparameters which must
exhibit consistency are (1) the maximum repayment period,(2) the student's
(internal) interest rate, and (3) the repayment tax rate. Also ofinterest are two
additional characteristics of a program, implied by the precedingparameters
the degree of internal subsidization and the expected (average)repayment period.
The central "exogenous" variable in the derivation ofconsistent program
parameter sets is the rate of interest at which the program is funded,the external
interest rate of the previous discussion. The determinationof the appropriate
external interest rate is crucially related to theassumptions made concerning
future income growth. The initial assumption,contrary to the available evidence,
is that the income profiles shift over time onlyas a result of inflationary changes in
prices and wages, i.e. that there isno observed secular increase in real (constant
dollar) incomes.
Major changes in nominal interest rates,e.g. the prime rate, are related to
changes in the rate of inflation. For example, inthe ten year period 1960-1969 the
prime commercial paper rate varied between3 and 7.9 percent. But,as shown in
Table 6. the real interest rate (primerate minus the rate of inflation) varied only
between 1.7 and 2.7 percent, significantly lessboth absolutely and relatively. In fact,
a conservative, but not unreasonable, assumptionwould be that the real interest
rate is approximately constant ata 2 to 3 percent level.
Thus, if we assume that nominal incomechange reflects only the efiCci of
inflation, arid that thesame is true of nominal interest rate variations,then only
base-year-dollar income predictions andthe real interest rate are required for the
derivation of VTL programparameters. In particular, consider the advancement
of a principle amount Pto be repaid in some futureyearn on an income contingcn
basis, with income inyear!I,measured in base year dollars, given by}. To advance
the amount P the VTL Fundborrows P and agrees toan annual interest rate', the nominal externalrate, which is equal to thesum of the real external rate,, and the rate of inflationd,i.e.' = +d.But nominal income is alsoassumed to grow at an annual rated;then in year ii nominal incomeis given by
(1 + dy.
The requiredrepayment in year n is a proportiont of this income.
The amount the Fund willhave spent on the individualis the principle amount P pIus all accrued interest,i.e.




NOMINAl. INTEREST RATIS, R.Au5 Of INFI.AIli)NANt) REAL RAILS OF INIFRLSF
The break-even condition is simply thatthe amount expended (principle and
interest) equal the amount repaid inyear n, i.e.
P(l + r + d)'1tY,,(l + d).
This can be rearranged into the following expressionand. for j and d smafl, an
associated approximation :
l+d /
Of course, the VTL programs employa series of future incomes, but the principle
is unchanged.
More generally, the interest rate of relevanceas the Fund's borrowing rate is
what James Tobin has referred to as the "incomerate of interest," defined as tile
difference between the nominal interest rate and therate of growth of income. real






















51 2.16 90.5 7.8 -5.6
52 2.33 92.5 2.2 0.!
53 2.52 93.2 0.8 1.7
54 1.58 93.6 0.4 1.2
55 2.18 933 -0.3 2.5
56 3.31 94.7 1.5 1.8
57 3.81 98.0 3.5 0.3
58 2.46 100.7 2.8 -0.3
59 3.97 101,5 0.8 3.2
60 3.85 103.1 1.6 2.3
61 2.97 104.2 I.! 1.9
62 3.26 105.4 1.2 2.!
63 3.55 106.7 1.2 2.4
64 3.97 108.1 1.3 2.7
65 4.38 109.9 1.7 2.7
66 5.55 113.1 2.9 2.7
67 5.10 116.3 2.8 2.3
68 5.90 121.2 4.2 1.7
69 7.83 127.7 5.4 2.4plus inflationary. The realrate above is equivalent toTobin's "inComerate of interest" under theassumption of a zero rate of growthof real Incone
Thus, the Fund's borrowingrate is initially assumed to be3 percentassociated wth inflationary incomegrowth only. In !ecentterms theseassunlptions Would translate into a nominal iiiteretrate of7 percent and a rateofinflatiofl(dfdinCome growth) of 4 percent. Whenreal income growth isincorporated theFund's income borrowing rate will bereduced by 1.5percent (the assumedrate of Secular real growth).
"Nominal" equivalents providea benchmark for selectinga range of internal (student) interest rates toexamine. With not insignificantattention to usurylaws and probable studentreactions, a nominal internal(student) rate of 12percent was selected as the maximum forattention; assuminga 4 percent rate ofinflation, this implies a five pointspread between the Fund'sreal borrowingrate (3 percent)and the maximum real internalrate (8 percent). Within thisintervalpoint difrerentials (3.5 to 8 percent)were employed to empiricallyderive the VTLprogram tradeoff possibilities. Parameter sets withtax rates above 2percent per SI ,000 borrowingare ignored.
For convenience, fivemaximum repaymentperiods were utilized,ranging from 15 to 35years in five-year increments.For each "internalinterest rate maximum repayment period"combination, the Fund'szero profit taxrate was computed'° Then, giventhe threeparameters, the subsidy ratioand expected repayment period were determined.
The zero-profitparameter loci consistent withthe underlyingborrowing and income profiles andwith the 3percent external real interestrate-zero real income growth assumptionsare displayed in Figure4. In additionto mortality, the estiniates incorporateadministrative Costs of5 per yearper $1,000 borrowed (augmented, in nominaldollar terms, by therate of income growth). Several features ofthe r-t lockwarrant attention. First,the loci become flatter as the taxrate is increased(i2r/j2> 0): or beginning withhigh tax and low internal interestrates, a slight increasein the interestrate permits a sunbstantial reduction in the taxrate. But the change intax rate resulting froma given interest rate change declinesContinuously as theinterest rate increases.This is explained by the fact thatas the tax rate falls fewerand fewer incomeprofiles exit priorto the end of themaximumrepayment periodbut interestrate increases permittax rate reductions onlyby increasingthe Fund'ssurplus on exiters; theyexit later (because of the interestrate increase and thetax rate reduction)and at a higherrate differentialThus, as thepool of exitersdeclines, thepotential increase in exiter- surplus is reducedand the permittedtax reductiondisappears. Using the35-year program as a case inpoint, an increasein the interestrate from 4.5 to 5percent permits an 0.25percent reduction inthe tax rate (from0.96 to 0.71percent). However, a changein the interestrate from 5.5to 8 percent permitsonly an 0.09Percentchange in thetax rate: in the firstcase only three of theincome profiles
10 For
heurjsic purposesit seemed clearerin the analytical Sectionto form the explicit function with the lntenal
interest rate as afunction of the taxrate and the maximum
repayment period For
purposes of empirical
solution, however thesimplest procedurewas to set an interest rate andniaximum repayment period and solcfor the taxrate. In general terms.
Iheordering of the variablesin the explicit
function is amatter of indifference
76are committed for the full 35 years, while in the second (an interest rate of 5.5
percent) ten profiles never exit.
EXPLANATIONS: FIGURES 4-11
These figures have been drassn using a Computer controlled plotter. The variable names found in the
diagrams are defined below:
ADCST: the administrative costs in real dollars per year per real dollar of original borrowing.
INT IN: Y (yes) interest is accrued prior to repayment initiation on outstanding student balances.
NO (no) interest is not accrued prior to repayment initiation.
LL: maximum number of years lag from original borrowing to repayment initiation. (In all cases
examined here LL = 8.)
IMORT: V (yes) adjustment of repayment streams to reflect effects of mortality is made.
NO (no) mortality adjustment is not incorporated.
RB: external interest rate (in fractional units) at which the programs are funded (real).
PROM LGTH, SYM: the program length (maximum repayment period) in years and a symbol used
in the plot which identifies the zero-profit locus for this maximum term and the five parameters
initialized as shown at the left on the same line.
R: (vertical axis) internal student interest rate (real = nominal - rate of inflation).
T: (horizontal axis) repayment tax rate, percent per S 1,000 real original borrowing.
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Figure 4
Secondly, the shift in the locus resulting from a reduction in themaximum
repayment period becomes greater as the repayment periodis reduced. For
example, at a 6 percent interest rate, a shift from a 35- to a 30-year programrequires
an increase of only 0.07 percent in the tax [ate(from 0.59 to 0.66 percent), while the
77
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05 '.5shift from a 20 to a 1 5 year program requires the much greater taxlate increase of
0.38 percent (from 0.96 to 1.34 percent). Two factors explain this
phenomenon First, for all of the profiles except the lowest income is assumedto grow beyond
year IS: therefore a 15-year program must compensate for the factthat itis
taxing significantly lowci average ificoliles. While this is true tosome degree for all
maximum terni reductions, the impact is less for longerrepayment periods because
of the decline in the present value ofinconie received further in thefuture Thus,the
second explanation is that income earned. and hencerepayments made, in the 30th
to 35th years have very low present values (SI received 30years in the future hasa 3 percent discounted present value of about 50.41); thepresent value of year i
income and repayments is much higher (Si hasa present value of 50.64, discounting
at 3 percent for 15 years). As a result, the compensating tax ratereduction (holding
the internal interest rate constant and lengthening the maximumrepaynlent period)
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the expected repayment term increases as tax rates arereduced and interest rates
are increased. Also.for a given interest rate the expected ternidecreases with
reductions in the maximum term (increasesin the tax rate); holding the tax rate
constant, reductions in the maximum term(increases in the interest rate) imply
reductions ill average term due to thereduced term of liability of very low income
participants. not offset by the longerrepayment ternis of higher incomeparflci-
pants.
The iso-subsidy curves Figurc 6) areobserved to be positively sloped and
approximately linear, with a slight flattening athigh interest rates. Thus. a given
incremental increase in the interest raterequires that the tax rate he increased by a
virtually constant absolute amount if theoriginal subsidy level is to he maintained
For low levels of subsidy. increasesin interest rates require subsiant Ia! coniPensat-
ing increases in tax rates (and conseqUcntreductions in maximum repayment
terms) while higher levels of subsidyrequire much smaller changes in tax ratesto
compensate for a given interest rateincrenient. The explanation of thisvariation
in compensating tax rate changeis that, holding the tax rate constant,at low
interest levels an incremental changein the interest rate raises theFund's subsidy
significantly, requiring that there be amajor increase in tax rates toreduce the
subsidy to its former level (a reductionachieved through the greater paymentsby
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so7sHincrease than belore, while at highinterest rate levels thesame chanm th interest rate has a very small impacton the Fund's internalsubsidy (since'all profiles not exiting are unallected)and hence requiresa very small
conlpensatjng change in the la.x rate.
The sensitivity of the iero-profitfoci to thevarious incorporateeltal uris assessed in Figurc.s 71. which compare the 20-and SO-yearmaximum terni mci with and without certainunderlying characteristics Ineach care thehenchnIrk is provided by the 20-and 30-year plans of Figure4. characteri,e&i bya 3 percent real borrowing rate, interestaccrual in lag years,administrative Costs ofSSper year per SI 0O0 of original borrowing, andinclusion of mortalityetThcts inzero_profit plan derivation.
Existing student loanprograms (NDEA. GLP)provide for theflon-accrual of interest during lagyears (when the borrower isa registered student)While this might be accomplished bydirect subsidy,a VTL program couldprovide internally for non-accrual in lagyears through higher taxor interest ratesor fliaxinlum repayment periods, in whichcase students with longerlags fromtime of borrowing to repayment initiation wouldhe subjdiied by thosewith shorter lagsThe effects of this internalcompensation for non-accrwjl ofinterest prior torepa)rnent are shown in Figure 7. Forhigh interest rateprograms, under whichmost inconle
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lIgure 7
80profiles repay for the full period. the tax rate increase compensating for interest
non-accrual is quite small; at an 8 percent interest rate for a thirty year program
the required tax rate change is only 0.04 percent (from 0.61 to C. 65 percent).
Howeer. for lower interest programs. e.g. 6 percent for a 30-year program. the tax
rate increase compensating for non-accrual is a much higher 1.02 percent (from
0.66 to 1.68 percent). due to the fact that non-accrual and lower rates release higher
income borrowers much earlier.
Because the lower income borrowers (predominantly "less than hacca-
laureate'') have the shortest average lags to repayment, interest non-accrual has
highly regressive implications. For a 30-year program with a 6 percent interest
rate and interest accrual, the five lowest income profiles are subsidized (the present
value of repayments is kss than the present value of borrowingII) bthe ten
highest income profiles. With non-accrual of interest the two highest income
profiles are subsidized. and of the low income profiles only the lowest receives a
subsidy. Profiles 2 thru1 3 provide the subsidy with the third lowest profIle
making the greatest subsidy contribution (S0.4l per SI of debt at initiation of
repayment). Thus. non-accrual of interest in lag years appears to he a highly
undesirable feature when compensation is provided internally.
Governmental provision of free life-insurance is a universal characteristic
of existing student loan programs. The impact of extending such insurance to
VTL's is demonstrated in Figure 8, which compares the base 20 and 30 year loci
to plans which do not include provision for mortality. The results are predictable:
mortality has a greater impact proportionately on long than on short maximuni
term programs. At a 6 percent interest rate, the exclusion of mortality reduces the
tax rate by 0.05 percent for both the 30-year plan (from 0.66 to 0.61 percent) and
for the 20-year plan (from 0.96 to 0.91 percent); however, the relative change is
almost twice as great in the case of the 30-year program (0.05/0.66 versus 0.05/0.96).
The value of the governmental subsidy implied by the provision of free
insurance can be easily coniputed. If 'm is the zero-proht lax rate with adjustment
for mortality and t,without such adjustment, then the borrower would have to
pay a lump sum amount P for insurance in the second case andwould receive in
effect only an amount SI .000 - P at the lower tax rate. P is theit given by
Ij




In the 6 percent interest case the 30-year program premium is S7while for the
20-year program it is only S52 (in present value at the time ofrepaynientinitiation).
Note that this insurance premium represents both (a) thevalue of the govern-
mental subsidy in the case of free insurance and (b) the lump suminsurance
premium equivalent to the higher tax rate under prograni self-insurance.
In assessing the contribution to subsidy (positive or negative) the presenta)ue of payments
relative to the present value of borrowing is always evaluated am the initiation of repay rnenL
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A significant differencebetween public arid privateVii. proerarns wouldbe expected in the admjnjstrat lyecost dimension. At the extremea federally-sponsored program could place alladministr:iti;e_coIIect ionresponsibilities on the Internal Revenue Service and theSocial SecurityAdministratjoiiwith virtually zero marginal cost.
The effect of zeroadministrati'e costs, holdingother program characteristics constant, is shown in Figure 9
Since administrativecosts arc recouped entirelythrough the differential between the externalborrowing rate and theinternal studentrate, the reduction in tax rates isgreatest at low student interestrate levels. Using the 30-yearprogranis as cases in point atan 8 percent studentrate the exclusion ofadininistrativecosts reduces the tax rateonlybyO.O7perce,1t(fr0.61 toO.54 percent). hutata5 percent interest rate thereduction is 0.16percent (from 0.8 to 0.64percent). A final dimension inwhich a publiclysponsored program might dilThr froma private program is inthe external interestrate at which theprogram is funded. A federalprogram would be ableto (a) borrow at lowerfederal rates (on average implYing a reduction ofabout 0.5 percent) andpossibly (h) receivea direct interest subsidy (as under theNDEA and, overcertain periods, the GLPprograms). An indirect federal subsidycould be obtainedvia state-sponsoredprograms funded
Ir
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with tax-exempt borrowing (producing a reduction at current nominal interest
rate levels of about 1.5 percent).
Taking a tax-exempt state program as an example. and employing a "real"
external borrowing rate of 1.5 percent. the consequent shift in zero-profit loci is
portrayed in Figure 10. With a 30-year, 6 percent student rate program. this
reduction in the external interest rate permits a tax rate reduction of 0.18 percent
(from 0.66 to 0.48 percent); at the lower student interest rate of 4.5 percent this
tax rate reduction is even larger. 0.59 percent (from 1.10 to 0.51 percent). The
reduction is also larger for a 6 percent---20 year plan: 0.25 percent (from 0.96 to
0.71 percent).
The effect of a (directly or indirectly) subsidized interest rate can also be
examined by holding the tax rate constant. For a 30 year program with a tax rate of
0.63 percent. the unsubsidized 3 percent external rate requires an internal student
interest rate ofó.5 percent ; a subsidized 1.5 percent external rate reduces the student
rate to 3.5 percent. For a 20-year. 0.86 percent tax rate prograni. subsidization
reduces the student interest rate from 7.5 to 4 percent.
As was noted, the above programs were estimated on the assumption of
zero secular real income growth. In fact, a more neutral assumption would be that
the income profiles (in real dollars) shift up over time at a rate of about 1.5 percent
83
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Figure 10
per year. With the realrate of interestaSSume(l to be 3percent this rate of rca! growth would implyan "income rate of interest"of 1.5 percent. i.e.the zero profit loci (for anunsubsidized plan) would beidentical to thoseestimated for a SUbsidized plan with a realborrowing rate of 1.5percen( However, theinterpretatjotis would differ. for theSubsjdizcd plans ofFigure 10, thenominal student ratewould be simply the "real"student rate plus therate of inflation (e.g. 4percent. as utilized earlier). But theinclusion of realincome growthrequires that the (rcaljincome rate be augmented byboth the rate ofinflation and therate of real growth (4and 1.5 percentrespectively). Thus tocompare private (unsubsidized)plans including and excluding realgrowth the student'Income rate of interest"in the real growth case must beaugmented by the rate ofreal growth, i.e.comparisons utilizing different rates ofgrowth must transform"income rates of interest"into con- 'entionaI real rates ofinterest (definedas the nominal rate minusonly the rate of inflation)
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V. REPAYMENT INCIDENCE AM) REI)IsTRIBUTI0N
As discussed in the Introduction one interpretation oIVTL devices is in terms
of beneficiary taxes applied to recipients (for support) of higher education. It
differs in one major respect from other such taxes: it is voluntary. One can obtain
education without being subject to the tax. However, for students without alterna-
Uve means of support it is not optional. and for these tile tax interpretation can
be entertained. (However, recall that other interpretations can be argued to be more
appropriate, specifically the income insurance interpretation.) Recognizing the
incompleteness of the tax framework, it is still interesting to consider the re-
distributions implicit in VTL programs in terms applied to the incidence of other
taxes. i.e. in ternis of progressivity, proportionality, and regressivity.
Since individual borrowers repay over different periods of time (high income
recipients exit earlier), it is necessary to analyze incidence in terms of the present
value of income and repayments. Two questions arise at this stage. First, what
discount rate should be employed in converting to present values? And second, over
what period should income be discounted? Examining repayments from the
vantage point of the repayment initiation year (year zero), it is clear thatthe







11or lend. a rate which wouldhe expected toan systemattcallwith income.' 2 I lowever. theserates are not known. TheOn l\ Oh\IOUS atteiiiatlye lot he borrower- specific rates is the externaltate at which theprogram is funded. Inthe case ofa socially optimalprogritill this is the socialrate of time preference.'
Wtth reference to theappropriate period fothe evaluation ofincome, similar complexities arise. Shouldthe period he (I) thatdefined by theborrowerstime horizon. 12) the lifetime ofthe borrower. (3) theterm over whichrepayments are actually made, or (4) thema mum term of theprogram subject toanalvsis' The first would be appropriateonly if horrover-speciticdiscount rateswere applied. The second could heargued to he sociallyrelevant. The thirddistorts comparisons between individuals inthe same plan (reducingthe variahilitin the relationship between payments andincon1c. Since themaxim tim term isa discretionar parameter of theprogram. it would appearto he one appropriatebasis for analysis. Employing this period,the effective questionconcerns the incidenceover the period individualsmight he (hut notnecessarily are) subjectto the tax. Therise of lifetime income wouldprobably not significantlyalter the observedpatterns of incidence.
In the analysis thefollowing symbolsare employed P the present valueof repayments(discounted in allcases at 3 pet centper SI .000 of outstandingdebt at the time ofrepayment initiation(employing the income-specificaverage distribution ofborrowing by lagto repay- ment : at initiation ofrepayment theaverage studentowes Si .092 per SI .000 borrowed,with interest accruedat an external rateof 3 percent). N : the relevantmaximum terni.
R the real student(internal) interestrate. The incidence ofa given program fora particular studentis then definedas P 1. the ratio ofpayment to income. 14
Incidence relativeto income fortwo of the basic30-year programsof Figure 4 is displayed inFigure 12. Forcomparison theabsolutepayments P arc also displayed asa function of income.The high interestprogram. from which onlythe highest incomeprofile exitsprior to maximumterm, exhibitsa very narrowrange of variation inthe ratio ofpayments toincome (about 0.45to 0.55 percent); absolute paymentsrise continuouslywith income.The low interest(4.5 percent) program. from whichtwelve of the fifteenprofiles exit priorto maximumterm. exhibits sharpregrcssi\'ity. the ratioof paymentsto incomeranging from above I percent at S100.000 incometo 0.25 percentat an income of5475.000. Similarly.
In additton.differentials betweenhorro tug andietliIitttales \\ ottiri hepccled to exit bit
svtetnatic iticoutesartattot). jiiiroductniadd I tonal cotpIexitie' into theincidence anaivos in oct. the lu iditierate tios difler [routthe soctai t.tte otttttte rterneeti the c.e otstthstdti.i
i ott of Interestto account for theeslcrnui hcnetits ofeducation. Ittits, thesocial rate oft tie treference
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absolute payments peak at about SI .200 at a SI 25.00() income,and then decline to
about SI.I75.
As denionstrated in Figure 13. comparing a 30- to a20-year plan. holding
the interest rate constant, the longer term plin(employing a lower tax rate and
thus obtaining a larger surplus from existing groups) issomewhat less regressive.
The regressivity of non-accrual of interest in lag years.with internal fund
compensation. is clearly displayed in Figure 14. comparing30-year. 6 percent
student interest plans dillering only in termsof interest accrual. With interest
accrual payments as a percentage of income decline from0.6 to 0.3. while wit Ii non-
accrual the decline is from above 1.5 percent to about0.2 percent. moving from
low to high incomes. With non-acci ual absolute payments arehighest )S 1.2(X)) at a
S100.000 inconie, and lowest (less than S 1.000) atincomes above 5300.000-
Finally, the virtual proportionality obtainable from asubsidized "slate'' plan
is demonstrated in Figure 15. comparing 30-yearplans. the stibsiditetl plan
borrowing at a real rate of 1.5 percent)With a higher student rate of 7 percent
virtually perfect proportionality could be attained.This is the limit in movenient
toward progressivity Iwith a fixed tax rate). unless incomeis significantly related.
inerscly. to average lag years.
A noted in foot note Il ahie. the a ppr4ipriaie procdu re in caseof sit bsitiii,it nit is to di
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Figure 5The shape of the payment-interest ratefunctions is explained by the impact of
interest rate changes onthe actual repayment period. If a prolIlc is not paying for
the maximum term, then aninterest rate increase (and a compensating tax rate
reduction) will increase the present valueof repayments (evaluated at the real
3 percent fund rate)the interest differential charged on the outstanding student
balance will be higher, and the balancein any year will be larger and will persist for
a longer period.However, once maximum term is reached, an income profIle
reaps absolute benefitsfrom interest rate increases: the tax rate is reduced and in
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Figure 16
For the lowest income group (15).increases in interest rates are beneficial
throughout, since this profile does not exitprior to maximum term under anyof
the programs examined. At this lowincome the present value of repayments never
exceeds the value of borrowing as aresult this group would never find con-
ventional loans preferable to a VTL.although at low interest rates other alterna-
tives might be preferred.
In the case of (lie low quartile incomeprofile interest rate increases are always
beneficial for a thirty year plan (the borrower repaysfor the maximum term) but
are beneficial only above5 percent for 20-year plans. This group repaysless than
its borrowing only at rates above5.5 percent, and interest rates of4.5 to 5 percent
produce repayments of almost Sl.25 perSt benefit (amount borrowed pluslag
year interest).
For the median income group.repayment for the maximum termoccurs
at interest rates of 5.5 and6 percent : these programs areleast desirable, witht
repayments of somewhat less than S 1.5per SI benefit. Here stgiifjctjitshifts to other forms of finance might he expected.!
For a borrower will) high-quartileIncome payments reacha max inium of over SI .5 per SI benefIt at interest rates of about6 percent. I I1terestigthis is the first incomegroup for which 20-year maximumterm programs domiite
30-ycar programs at each interestrate. This suggests that if both 20-and 30-year options were available the longerterm alternative mightexperience significaii negative selection in favor of the shorlerprogram.
This domination of the longer bythe shorter program is alsoobserve(j for the highest income profile. Since thisgroup never is held for full term, itIS "damaged" throughout by interest tate increases,its burden rising fromabout SI. 10 to SI.75 (20-year) or S2 (3O-year)per benefit dollar.
VI. VTL CAPITAl.RlQulRENIFNrs
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However, it is withinthe purview of this study to examine thefinancial character-
istics of VTL lending programs overtime.
The debt profiles of afund offering three aliernative VTL options with one
year of originallending and a 4 percent rate of inflation aredisplayed in Figure 17.
Of the two 30-year plans,the debt requirements of the high interest (10 percent)
low tax (0.66 percent)plan are significantly greater than those of the lowinterest
(8.5 percent)high tax (1.09percent) alternative. In the first case total debt out-
standing reaches a maximum ofSLS4O (per S 1,000 of year 0 lending in year14,
while in the second case total debtreaches only $1,240 in year 6. A 20-year plan
with an intermediate tax rate of 0.96percent (an interest rate of 10 percent)has a
maximum debt of $1,280, occurring in year7. This rapid increase in debt to fairly
high levels is explained by the low ornon-existent payments in early years, when
borrowers experience relatively lowincomes or have not yet commenced repay-
ment. The debt of the fund onthe account of any year's lending is notextinguished
until borrowers with the greatest(8-year) lag to repayment and with thelowest
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More interesting thanthe debt profile ofa fund on account ofone year's lending is the debt historyof a fund oflèringa Constant real level ofnew lending in each year.
Two suchconhinuouslenJjng debt profilesare displayed in Figure18. In real terms the two plansare idcntjcal a real externalrate of3 percen(,zero secular real row(h real studentrates ofó percent, taxrates ofO.fl6perceflt,afldmaximum terms of3O years. Howeverthe lower profileassumes a zero rateofjnfiatio,i (newlending of$ 1,000 in eachyear), while theUpper profile incorporitesthe effects ofa4 percent annual rate of inflation,with new lending ineach year increasingat the rateof (inflationary) incomegrowth.'7
In the absence ofinflation, debt reachesa stable,zero-groyth plateau after thirtyeight years, whenthe plan containsa full contingent ofborrowers fromeach income profile andeach lag torepayment at each stage of
repayment Thus, the rate of growthofdebt in the maturephase is equal tothe rateofinflation, in this case zero. When inflationis incorporated,the mature phaseexhibits aconstant rate of growthofdebt equal to therate of inflation,e.g. 4 percentas in the higher debt profile of Figure18.
' Inco,grow(inflationary orreat)scres to reducethe (as rate pernominaj 51,000ofborrowing
by a factorI/fl + g), whereg is the total rateofsecular incongrowth. AlternateJy'as treated here.
theamount borrowedper basic tax rateunit can be Viewed
as increasing by a factor(I f g). If the higher
education Sector isassumed to
experience increases inper student costsat the rate of incomegrowth
(because of secularstagnatjincluding real income
growth), then the latteralternatj.e reflecting
increasing studentcharges, is moreappropriate.
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